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Gaining control over refugee flows and undocumented migrants currently dominate
the media and political arenas in Europe. Underlying driving and enduring forces,
such as employment-related migration pressure, tend to be relegated to the
background. In this article, we explore migration pressure prospects up to 2035 in
four countries with a tradition of emigration to Europe: Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and
Turkey. More specifically, we first derive a simple decomposition model based on the
relationship between working-age population (WAP) growth and growth of gross
domestic production (GDP) and worker productivity (GDP/W). From this model, we
derive an indicator of migration pressure: size of the non-employed population in a
country. This model is then used as framework for deriving storylines for three
different scenarios of economic and demographic change up to 2035. Subsequently,
storylines are operationalized, leading to scenario estimates of migration pressure up
to 2035. The implications of the results are then discussed. Time series of macro-level
economic and demographic data are used to underpin scenario assumptions.
Scenario results suggest that in all countries employment ratios are expected to
increase, but only in Tunisia is the size of the non-employed population—our
indicator of migration pressure—expected to decline, irrespective of the scenario.
Depending on the scenario, migration pressure remains high in Turkey and Morocco
and may even become somewhat higher. The general conclusion is that in the long
term, after 2035, labour migration pressure can be expected to decrease because the
growth and size of the working-age population is decreasing while employment
ratios are rising.Introduction
Today’s debates in the media and political arenas in countries of the European
Union (EU) are dominated by how to gain control over rising numbers of refugees
and uninvited labour migrants from countries in Africa and Asia. Recent delibera-
tions about visa-free travel for Turkish citizens entered the debate because it may
lead to new flows of employment-seeking Turkish citizens to the EU. This focus
on the management of and control over immigration and migrant-integration
tends to overshadow the driving and enduring forces underlying migration in the
countries of origin, such as un- or underemployment. This is the focus of our art-
icle, whereby we explore current conditions and future prospects of employment-
related migration pressure in four countries in the Mediterranean region with aThe Author(s). 2016 Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
icense (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium,
rovided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and
ndicate if changes were made.
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though immigrants to the European Union come from many countries, the great
majority of non-western immigrants come from these four countries only (e.g.
Fargues 2005).
During the 1950s and 1960s, these countries became the main countries of origin of im-
migrants to Europe. Poverty and high rates of unemployment were push factors while
high demand for low-skilled labour was the main pull factor. Most labour migrants, al-
most exclusively men, decided to stay in destination countries and reunify with spouses,
family and relatives. By 2005, over six million people had moved from countries in the
South and Southeast Mediterranean region to the EU. About 90% of these immigrants
came from the three Maghrebi countries and Turkey. While Maghrebi migrants mainly
moved to France, Spain, Italy and The Netherlands, Turkish migrants mainly moved to
Germany, The Netherlands, Austria and France (Fargues 2005; OECD 2015).
Since the 1980s, demand for non-EU low-skilled labour immigrants waned, while de-
mand for jobs has remained high in these origin countries, despite considerable eco-
nomic growth. For instance, between 2000 and 2015, gross domestic product (GDP)
growth was in the range of 3 to 6% annually but this was mainly due to increase in the
value of output produced by existing workers—our proxy for worker productivity—than
to the increase of numbers of workers (ILO 2015; IMF 2015). Furthermore, these coun-
tries realized growth rates of working-age populations in the age range 15 to 65 years
which outperformed economic growth rates (UNPD 2016). This contributed to increase
of welfare disparities with EU neighbours and pressure to emigrate (e.g. Castles et al.
2014; EC 2011; Schiffbauer et al. 2015). To illustrate, in 2015, per capita GDP in
Algeria was about $13,823 (PPP, constant 2011 international dollars ($)), $7,361 in
Morocco, $10,726 in Tunisia and $18,959 in Turkey. In the main destination countries,
it was $44,053 (Germany), $46,374 (The Netherlands) and $37,306 (France) (World
Bank 2016). Labour emigration to the EU has increasingly become constrained by stric-
ter EU immigration policies, following concerns about national security, immigrant in-
tegration and social cohesion (e.g. Carrera et al. 2012)
This raises the question about what the future might bring in terms of migration
pressure in these four countries. EU governments expect that pressure will further
increase by pointing at increasing numbers of citizens and transit migrants
attempting to enter the EU illegally in search of work or refuge (e.g. Collett 2013;
Fergusson 2014). Qualitative scenarios of the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) up to 2035 suggest that labour migration
pressure will rise due to overcrowding of local labour markets, despite modest
growth of job opportunities (OECD 2009). Others foresee that in the long-term
labour migration pressure in these four countries will dissipate because there are
signs that population growth rates are declining in these countries and that these
countries may increasingly become countries of immigration of residents of other
countries in Africa and Asia (e.g. De Haas 2011). So far, these views have not been
underpinned by quantitative exploratory research.
In this article, our objectives are (1) to identify a macro-economic and demographic
decomposition model as framework for deriving economic-demographic scenarios up
to 2035 for four study countries and (2) to explore what the implications of scenario re-
sults are for employment-related migration pressure.
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A plethora of macro- and micro-level factors give rise to international migration, such
as psychological, social, economic, political and environmental factors in countries of
origin and destination (e.g. Castles et al. 2014). Depending on the setting, income and
employment differences between countries and regions can be important in explaining
international migration, such as in the case of our study countries. In the academic lit-
erature, several theories confirm that spatial differences in employment are important
to international migration. For instance, dual and segmented labour market theories
posit that migration is mainly the result of labour needs in destination countries arising
from upward job mobility of the resident population, away from insecure, low-quality
and low-income jobs. Immigrants are expected to fill such positions. People migrate be-
cause they are ‘pulled’ by demands and opportunities in foreign labour markets. Neo-
classical economic theory adds a micro-level decision-making perspective by arguing
that persons migrate because financial returns to their educational attainment and oc-
cupational skills are higher elsewhere. The new economics of migration theory ex-
pounds this view by pointing to the importance of the household as the decision-
making unit. In this context, decisions are taken as to who migrates and what is ex-
pected of the migrant. Migration is just one of several income risk-aversion and risk-
diversification strategies households apply to survive. Migrants are expected to remit
part of their earnings leading some receivers to migrate too. World systems theory
places micro-level migration decision-making in the wider context of societal-level fac-
tors. For instance, interacting labour markets may lead to the transfer of conventions
about employer-employee relations from one country to another, pushing certain
people out of work in one country and increasing demand for their labour in another
country, leading to migration (Castles et al. 2014; Van Dalen et al. 2005a).
At the macro-level, pressure to migrate is often defined rather loosely and differently,
such as in terms of high demographic growth, low welfare and wellbeing or lack of em-
ployment (Castles et al. 2014). Some authors are more specific in their definition. For
instance, Schaeffer (1993) defines migration pressure in a country in terms of the vol-
ume of long-term demand for income-earning opportunities abroad. This pressure is
influenced by people’s expected economic, legal and social status abroad, costs of mi-
gration and other characteristics in destination countries. Potential migrants compare
destination countries and country of residence regarding such features. Straubhaar
(1993) defines migration pressure as excess supply of migration-willing people in origin
countries relative to total demand for immigrants in destination countries. In this def-
inition, great importance is attributed to the effect of migration policies in destination
countries on migration pressure in origin countries.
Migration pressure as defined by Bruni and Venturini (1995), the one adopted in this
article, is particularly useful to our study. Contrary to the previous two definitions,
focus is almost entirely on conditions in countries of origin. Migration pressure is
defined as excess domestic labour supply in the presence of negative per capita income
differences with other countries. The latter means that labour migrants only move to
countries where employment and income prospects are higher.
Bruni and Venturini (1995, pp. 380–381) make a distinction between migration pres-
sure and actual migration. The former is defined as a macro-level phenomenon and the
latter as a micro-level phenomenon. More specifically, migration pressure is indicated
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non-employed population of working age. Migration pressure increases when numbers
of non-employed persons decrease and vice versa. Migration pressure is to be inter-
preted as potential migration at the macro-level. However, actual migration is defined
at the micro-level. It is the propensity of an individual to migrate, i.e. the probability
that an individual willing to migrate will indeed migrate. This probability depends on
individual-level socioeconomic and demographic person characteristics and conditions
of the personal context, including perceptions about employment and income abroad
and barriers to migration such as restrictive immigration policies. Actual migration is
‘release’ of migration pressure, whereby the volume and direction of migration are con-
ditioned by the extent of negative income differentials with other countries. By making
a distinction between migration pressure and actual migration, Bruni and Venturini
(1995) avoid a potential circularity problem in the analysis of population projections in
that assumptions about future actual (net) migration at the micro-level influence results
and conclusions about migration pressure at the macro-level.
This conceptualization of migration pressure and actual migration is applicable to sit-
uations in poor and wealthy nations. In countries where income is low and unemploy-
ment benefits and social security systems absent, increase of excess labour supply can
be considered as a thermometer or early warning system for rising emigration inten-
tions. Unemployment and low income undermine the quality of life in households, es-
pecially in the long term. This puts pressure on household members to migrate to
places where employment and income prospects are brighter. In wealthier nations, in-
crease of excess labour supply generally does not lead to migration but only to a rise of
the non-employed population—and unemployment rates—because income prospects
elsewhere are mostly lower and because loss of employment is to some extent finan-
cially compensated by the unemployment and social security benefit system (Bruni and
Venturini 1995, p. 380).
Bruni and Venturini (1995, p. 382) also argue that the employed and underemployed
frequently are the ones migrating because such persons are responsible for sustaining
the lives of household members staying behind. Migration pressure increases if num-
bers of non-employed and financially dependent persons in the personal network in-
crease. This is confirmed by empirical studies (e.g. Esipova et al. 2011). Therefore, at
the macro-level, increase of the non-employed population in a country can be taken as
proxy for the inability of a country’s domestic economy to provide sufficient income-
earning employment to its working-age population and for a rise of migration pressure
at the macro-level.
Change in migration pressure—size of the non-employed population—is determined
by (1) change in the employment ratio and (2) change in working-age population size.
The numerator of the employment ratio—numbers of employed persons—is deter-
mined by economic factors, i.e. gross domestic product and output per worker (e.g. Gu-
tierrez et al. 2007; Shorrocks 1999; World Bank 2014a, 2014b). Output per worker
features as proxy for worker productivity and includes aspects of innovation and tech-
nology, capital and labour. The denominator of the employment ratio—the working-
age population—is determined by demographic factors (e.g. fertility, mortality, migra-
tion). The following parsimonious decomposition model summarizes and helps quanti-
fying the interrelatedness of all of these factors:




Essentially, the model decomposes gross domestic product (GDP) into contributionsfrom output per worker (GDP/W), the employment ratio (W/WAP) and the size of the
working-age population (WAP). We use this model as analytical framework for deriving
economic and demographic scenarios for the period 2015–2035 and for assessing
migration pressure change implied by the scenario results. To do so, the above decom-
position model must be restated in terms of (1) change of the employment ratio and (2)
change of the size of the non-employed population.
First, restatement in terms of change of the employment ratio is accomplished by tak-
ing natural logarithms and rearrangement of terms in Eq. (1), leading to the following




¼ ΔGDPt −ΔGDPtW t
 
−ΔWAPt ð2Þ
where ΔX equals the difference in the logarithm of X between 2 years. More specific-
ally, Eq. (2) conveys that the rate of change of the employment ratio depends on rates
of change in GDP, worker productivity and the working-age population. The implica-
tion is that, if the net (combined) rate of change of the two economic factors exceeds
the rate of change of the demographic factor, then the employment ratio increases so






Second, restatement in terms of change of the non-employed population is influencedby change in the aforementioned employment ratio as well as by change in the size of
the working-age population, that is,
ΔNEt ¼ ΔWAPt þ Δ 1− WtWAPt
 
ð4Þ
More specifically, the size of the non-employed population only starts declining afterdecrease of the non-employment ratio becomes larger than the increase of the






Thus, to explore migration pressure change during the 2015–2035 period involves
exploring future change in employment ratios and change in size of the non-employed
population, whereby we have to factor in the force of demographic growth embedded
in the population.
In terms of our analytical framework—decomposition model (1)—migration pres-
sure change can be explored after developing scenario assumptions about future
change in the model variables gross domestic production (GDP) and output per
worker (GDP/W), and about the determinants of working-age population (WAP)
change (i.e. fertility, mortality and actual migration). Below, we describe the
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operationalization and methodological aspects.Three economic-demographic scenarios
Scenario storylines
The business-as-usual scenario assumes that recent trends in demographic and eco-
nomic indicators for the four countries continue in future. The open economies sce-
nario assumes that countries develop as open societies participating in a global
economy without barriers to production, trade and international migration. The closed
economies scenario, a kind of anti-globalization scenario, assumes that countries move
away from international cooperation in favour of protectionism and restrictions regard-
ing the movement of capital, goods and people.
More specifically, the business-as-usual scenario assumes a continuation of past
trends (2000–2015) in terms of GDP and output per worker and production and trade
characterized by ad hoc styles of cooperation between countries in the region and with
the EU (e.g. EC 2011). The scenario assumes no further breakthrough in political, so-
cial, technological and cultural changes in these countries, while innovation and adop-
tion of new technologies in production, management, infrastructure and administration
will be at levels observed during the 2000–2015 period. By international standards,
GDP and output per worker remain at relatively low levels, notably in Morocco, Algeria
and Tunisia (ILO 2015). During the period 2000–2015, average annual GDP growth
was in the range of 3.2% (Tunisia) and 4.5% (Morocco), while growth of output per
worker was in the range of 2 and 3%, respectively, except in Algeria where for many
years output per worker stagnated. The value of our proxy for worker productivi-
ty—GDP per worker—differs considerably between these countries. In 2015, it ranged
between $34,920 (2011 PPP constant international dollars ($)) in Tunisia and $57,476
in Turkey (World Bank 2016).
In terms of demographic behaviour, these countries are expected to continue experi-
encing negative net migration with more people emigrating than immigrating (see
UNPD 2016). Regarding fertility, the scenario assumes a continuation of past trends
and that levels settle at the replacement level, but not before 2050. Regarding mortality,
improvements in life expectancy are expected to be lower than those in the next, more
favourable, scenario.
The open economies scenario assumes a future dynamic and globalized world econ-
omy. Production and trade take place without import and export barriers, while capital,
labour, technology and innovation can move freely around the globe. In this scenario,
the focus of government policies is to ensure smooth operation of production and trade
systems, observing internationally agreed rules. The main objective is to create an ‘en-
abling’ environment for economic actors, contributing to the growth of total produc-
tion and output per worker. Market forces, with limited government interference,
mainly determine employment issues. The traditionally high share of public sector em-
ployment declines to levels comparable to the lowest levels currently observed in
OECD countries (e.g. Boudarbat 2008; OECD 2014). Being aware that firms and the
labour force operate in a competitive environment, governments take on an active role
in supporting initiatives that contribute to the maintenance of existing economic
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resources. This becomes visible in high investments in development and modernization
of education and vocational skill infrastructures; development of talent, skills and entre-
preneurship; and by removal of social and economic barriers to the blossoming of tal-
ent. The society is characterized by a spirit of openness, which is reflected in the rapid
adoption of new technologies, management and working styles in the population,
among others.
During the period 2015–2020, relatively high emigration is observed among high-
skilled and educated young adults for whom yet insufficient high-quality and ad-
equately paid jobs are available. High emigration is also present among under- and un-
employed persons who are attracted by prospects of higher income, better living
conditions abroad and presence of family and relatives who migrated before and can be
of assistance before, during and after migration (e.g. Boyd 1989; Castles et al. 2014;
World Bank 2009).
During the period 2020–2025, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and Turkey are expected to
start blossoming, leading to lower emigration and higher immigration, including return
migration and immigration of children of former citizens who were born and raised in
countries of destination of their parents (e.g. De Haas 2011). This trend continues after
2025 leading to historically high numbers of immigrants and return migrants and rela-
tively low numbers emigrating. This scenario foresees increase of intercultural contact
between these countries and EU countries, leading to change in gender relations and
removal of sociocultural barriers to female labour force participation (e.g. World Bank
2011). Health services are expected to continue improving contributing to fertility de-
cline as unmet need of family planning largely disappears. Fertility decline is also fur-
thered because couples adopt smaller family size preferences. The latter is associated
with higher decision-making power of women in fertility matters, higher female educa-
tional attainment and higher female labour force participation (e.g. Bloom et al. 2009).
Fertility and mortality decline is more rapid than in both other scenarios.
The closed economies scenario is an anti-globalization scenario. The scenario de-
scribes a future resembling the state-society social contract model adopted by most
governments in the Middle East and North Africa after independence (e.g. Boudarbat
2008; Schiffbauer et al. 2015). This scenario is also assumed to apply to Turkey al-
though the country has a different social, economic and political history than the other
three countries. The social contract development model attributes great importance to
the role of the state in redistributing wealth, promotion of equity and provision of wel-
fare and social services. The government has a final say in all issues related to employ-
ment, wage rates and regulation of economic markets. Citizens accept restrictions on
political participation in exchange for economic security and provision of social ser-
vices, protection and other benefits. Management of the national economy is mainly
done by the state, with strong reliance on state planning. Governments perceive the na-
tion as an organic unity requiring precise steering and monitoring to preserve unity
and prevent social and political unrest.
Instead of economic collaboration with other countries, governments focus on pro-
tection of national markets from global competition and promotion of import-
substitution industrialization. This inward orientation constrains the economy because
it becomes difficult and costly to enhance worker productivity using new ‘foreign’
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than hiring more local labour and extend and intensify the use of existing production
equipment and technologies.
To cope with working-age population growth, governments permit institutions to ex-
pand staff, even if productivity is low, and they facilitate emigration (Ianchovichina and
Lundstrom 2009; Schiffbauer et al. 2015). Up to the 1990s, a similar kind of develop-
ment model was adopted in Maghreb countries, notably in Algeria. There, it led to con-
siderable GDP growth rates, averaging 3.7% per year, contributing to decline of poverty,
increase of health status, life expectancy, school enrolment and literacy. In later years,
this development model proved to be too costly leading to lower GDP growth, stagnat-
ing output per worker and rising unemployment. Although economic stabilization and
structural adjustment programmes of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) were
adopted to revitalize the economy and restructure public sectors, implementation has
been uneven, hesitant and incomplete (Schiffbauer et al. 2015).
This scenario therefore foresees that the social contract development model will pre-
vail in the future. Although traditional destination countries increasingly restrict immi-
gration, emigration is expected to increase to historically high numbers in these four
countries because employment conditions do not improve and citizens find ways to
realize their emigration plans using legal or illegal channels, including orientation on
new destination countries. Immigration and return migration reduce to low numbers.
Low economic growth and rising public sector costs reduce the speed of fertility de-
cline as governments spend less on maintenance and coverage of health and family
planning services, leading couples to have more children than they actually want. Mor-
bidity and mortality rates are also affected negatively so that life expectancy increases
less rapidly than in the other scenarios.Operationalization
We used demographic and economic data compiled by international organizations.
Demographic data were retrieved from databases and publications of the United
Nations (UN) and World Health Organization. For instance, for the scenarios, we
use base-year 2015 age-sex distributions of the UN Population Division (UNPD).
These are derived from recent national census population counts and auxiliary
demographic data sources (e.g. Demographic and Health Surveys) (UNPD 2016;
WHO 2014). To the extent that data or estimates of temporary residents such as
refugees and transit migrants are available, they have been included in UN mid-
year 2015 population estimates, as such estimates are based on de facto and not
on de jure residents. We realize that data on such kind of persons are known to
be deficient so that they are most likely underrepresented in these population esti-
mates. Economic data and indicators were derived from the World Bank (World
Bank 2016). We formulated scenario assumptions of fertility, mortality and migra-
tion for the period 2015–2050 and also produce projection results for that period.
As we choose for our economic scenarios a time horizon up to 2035, we only use
the population scenario results up to 2035. Estimates of future size and age struc-
ture of the population, including working-age population estimates, were derived
from demographic scenarios using the cohort component projection method (e.g.
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and economic model variables, described below, are summarized in Table 1.
International migration As explained before, Bruni and Venturini (1995) distinguish
between migration pressure, measured as excess labour force or size of the non-
employed population, and actual migration. The former is determined by macro-level
economic factors while actual emigration and immigration is determined by micro-
level factors where migration depends on a person’s propensity to migrate. Thus, it is
possible that in a positive economic growth scenario migration pressure decreases be-
cause employment opportunities increase, while actual emigration also increases. TheTable 1 Summary of scenario assumptions for indicators of model variables
Model variables and
indicators









UN medium variant net
migration numbers
(negative for all four
countries)
2015–2020 = 1.25 × average BAU
level
2020–2025 = changes to average
BAU level
2025–2030 = changes to zero by
2030
2030–2050 = changes to highest
recorded net migration number,
(+) sign is substituted for (−) if
highest number is negative (−)
2015–2025 = average
BAU level



















TFR 2015 level changes
to 2.1 by 2050
TFR 2015 level changes to 1.5 by
2050
TFR 2015 level















0.1875 life expectancy years











age pattern of mortality
estimate by country
Constant WHO 2008 age pattern







GDP 2015–2035 = average
annual GDP growth
rate 2000–2015
2015–2035 = 1.25 times BAU
scenario




GDP/W 2015–2035 = average
annual GDP/W growth
rate 2000–2015
2015–2035 = 1.25 times BAU
scenario Morocco (Morocco,




aUnited Nations (UN) (1992), Preparing migration data for subnational population projections, pp. 41–44. New York. 1992
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for population scenarios up to 2050 do not conflict with inferences derived from results
of those population scenarios regarding migration pressure (i.e. changes in the size of
the non-employed population). Since immigration and, in particular, emigration statis-
tics are often unreliable, we use migration assumptions expressed in net migration
numbers. Baseline and historical net migration estimates were obtained from databases
maintained by the UN (e.g. Preston et al. 2001). For the business-as-usual scenario, we
adopted the United Nations medium variant net migration assumptions (UNPD 2016).
The open economies scenario assumes higher net negative net migration up to 2020
than in the business-as-usual (BAU) scenario, as emigration is expected to increase in
the take-off stage of development while immigration hovers around a constant low
level. Between 2020 and 2025, growth of emigration is expected to level off and de-
crease when production and numbers of jobs start increasing. Return migration and
immigration also increases, so that by 2025, negative net migration is at the BAU level,
and by 2030, net migration has become zero. Between 2030 and 2050, net migration
turns positive, and by 2050, it has reached a historically high (positive) level. The rea-
son for this pattern of change is that, initially, during the take-off stage of economic
growth, it takes time before sufficient numbers of quality and adequately paid jobs are
generated which make many prospective migrants decide to stay and attract immi-
grants and return migrants. The closed economies scenario assumes that emigration in-
creases while immigration and return migration become very low leading to an
increase in negative net migration after 2025 to a historically high level of negative net
migration number by 2050. In all scenarios, net migration numbers are redistributed to
sex and age groups according to model age schedules of migration, while change over
time is assumed to unfold in a linear way (Rogers and Castro 1981; UN 1992).Fertility The business-as-usual scenario assumes that average fertility will have settled
at the replacement level by 2050 (i.e. total fertility rate (TFR) of 2.1 births). The open
economies scenario assumes a somewhat larger decrease of fertility so that by 2050 the
TFR will have declined to 1.5 births. The closed economies scenario assumes that aver-
age fertility will settle at an average of 2.4 births by 2050. All scenarios assume linear
change in fertility levels while age patterns of fertility conform to those of the United
Nations medium variant projections (UNPD 2016).Mortality The open economies scenario is the most favourable scenario in terms of
health and mortality conditions. It assumes that the rate of increase in life expectancy
in these countries is 75% of the average rate of increase—i.e. 2.5 life expectancy years
per decade (Oeppen and Vaupel 2002)—observed in countries of the world where his-
torical rates of increase have been highest. The business-as-usual and closed economies
scenarios assume 50 and 25% of the Oeppen and Vaupel (2002) estimate, respectively.
The World Health Organization (WHO) 2008 age pattern of mortality is assumed to
apply in all scenarios (WHO 2014).Gross domestic product We assume that in the business-as-usual scenario the average
annual GDP growth rate equals the average annual growth rate during the period
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and 2025–2035 are equal. For the open economies scenario, we assume that average
GDP growth rates will be 1.25 times higher than those in the business-as-usual scenario
in both time intervals, while the closed economies scenario assumes that GDP growth
rates will only be half the rate assumed by the business-as-usual scenario.Output per worker The open economies scenario assumes that the growth of
worker productivity will be higher than that in the business-as-usual scenario,
while for the closed economies scenario it is assumed that up to 2035 worker prod-
uctivity growth will be 0% per annum. The rationale for these assumptions is that
the open economies scenario assumes that GDP growth is realized mainly by
worker productivity growth and much less by growth of numbers of job vacancies.
For the closed economies scenario, we assume the opposite. The case of Algeria is
a special one as worker productivity growth has been at very low levels in the past,
while, periodically, considerable GDP growth was realized. This was the result of
labour market interventions of the government creating more jobs to reduce the
exodus of male residents in search for a job abroad (Furceri 2012). Contrary to the
situation in other countries, recent trends in GDP and worker productivity growth
of Algeria, basis for the business-as-usual assumptions, closely resemble assump-
tions of the closed economies scenario. This is reflected in similar assumptions
about future trends in these indicators.Results
Working-age population prospects
Regarding the first research objective about deriving economic-demographic scenarios
up to 2035 for our four study countries, Table 2 summarizes the main results of demo-
graphic projections for each scenario.
Results indicate that total and working-age populations are expected to continue
growing between 2015 and 2035. In 2015, the Turkish population of 79 million was of
similar size as the populations of the three Maghreb countries together (84 million),
and their working-age populations were about 53 and 57 million, respectively.
Working-age populations are expected to grow to figures close to 61 million in Turkey
and to 65 million in the Maghreb countries. Algeria is the Maghreb country with the
largest working-age population and Tunisia the one with the smallest.
According to expectation, differences between population scenario estimates are not
great because differences in fertility assumptions only affect working-age population
size in the long term, while effects of assumed changes in mortality and migration are
relatively small, compared with the effect of cross-country differences in age structure
in base year 2015.
Scenario estimates of the share of the working-age population in the total population
of Morocco, Algeria and Turkey indicate that, depending on the scenario, shares may
still increase slightly up to 2035. In the case of Tunisia, the working-age population
share seems to have reached its maximum value. This is the result of Tunisia being an
early adopter of small family size preferences in the past leading to reduced growth of
Table 2 Estimates of working-age-, total- and non-employed population, by country (×1,000)
Scenarios
Base year Business as usual Open economies Closed economies
2015 2025 2035 2025 2035 2025 2035
Morocco Working-age population 22,899 24,644 26,969 24,156 26,087 24,185 25,942
Total population 34,378 37,262 39,903 36,104 38,021 36,821 38,686
Working-age population share 66.6% 66.1% 67.6% 66.9% 68.6% 65.7% 67.1%
Non-employed population 11,373 11,388 11,443 11,340 11,574 10,004 8173
Algeria Working-age population 25,991 29,231 32,369 29,107 32,049 28,403 30,699
Total population 39,667 43,357 47,131 42,633 45,866 42,406 45,042
Working-age population share 65.5% 67.4% 68.7% 68.3% 69.9% 67.0% 68.2%
Non-employed population 14,221 12,322 8,077 16,206 17,909 14,296 13,790
Tunisia Working-age population 7,771 8.098 8,591 8,066 8,461 7,778 7,947
Total population 11,254 11,975 12,570 11,810 12,218 11,566 11,682
Working-age population share 69.1% 67.6% 68.3% 68.3% 69.3% 67.3% 68.0%
Non-employed population 4,359 4,209 4,159 4,233 4,155 3,776 3,252
Turkey Working-age population 52,542 57,686 61,162 57,798 60,936 57,038 60,070
Total population 78,666 84,563 90,469 83,892 88,871 84,088 89,557
Working-age population share 66.8% 68.2% 67.6% 68.9% 68.6% 67.8% 67.1%
Non-employed population 26,594 26,708 27,145 24,725 24,725 25,401 21,497
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son with growth of the elderly, i.e. age groups 65+).
The scenario results also show that the size of the population in the age range 15-64
without employment is expected to remain the same or slightly decrease in Morocco,
increase or decrease in Algeria and Turkey (depending on the scenario) and decrease
in Tunisia.
After around 2035—results not shown—all scenarios for all countries predict that working-
age population shares will decline, with the steepest decline in Tunisia, while the share of the
elderly in the population increases. For instance, by 2050, the working-age population share
estimate for Tunisia will be in the range of 62 and 64%, depending on the scenario.Migration pressure prospects
Regarding the second research objective about exploring what the implications of
the population scenarios are for employment-related migration pressure, Table 3
shows that in all countries migration pressure in terms of average annual growth
of the non-employed population has been increasing (+) considerably during the
baseline period 2000–2015. According to all scenarios, and for all periods, migra-
tion pressure is expected to decrease in Tunisia during the period 2015–2035. Re-
garding the other three countries, it depends on the scenario whether migration
pressure is expected to increase (+) or decrease (−). In the case of the closed econ-
omies scenario, migration pressure in all countries is expected to decrease during
the period 2025–2035. In the case of the business-as-usual scenario, both Algeria
and Tunisia migration are expected to experience migration pressure decline dur-
ing the period 2015–2035.

















Morocco GDP 4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 5.6% 5.6% 2.3% 2.3%
Output per worker 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 3.6% 4.4% 0.0% 0.0%
Working-age
population
1.7% 0.8% 0.7% 0.6% 0.8% 0.6% 0.7%
Employment ratio −0.1% 0.8% 0.9% 1.4% 0.5% 1.6% 1.6%
Non-employed
population
180,621 1,528 5,492 -3,287 23,356 −136,840 −183,178
Migration pressure + + + − + − −
Algeria GDP 3.6% 3.6% 3.6% 4.5% 4.5% 1.8% 1.8%
Output per worker −0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 3.6% 3.6% 0.0% 0.0%
Working-age
population
2.0% 1.2% 1.0% 1.1% 1.0% 0.9% 0.8%
Employment ratio 1.9% 2.4% 2.6% −0.2% 0.0% 0.9% 1.0%
Non-employed
population
105,304 −189,876 −424,462 198,533 170,245 7,490 −50,579
Migration pressure + − − + + + −
Tunisia GDP 3.2% 3.2% 3.2% 4.0% 4.0% 1.6% 1.6%
Output per worker 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 2.8% 2.8% 0.0% 0.0%
Working-age
population
1.5% 0.4% 0.6% 0.4% 0.5% 0.0% 0.2%
Employment ratio −0.2% 0.9% 0.7% 0.8% 0.7% 1.6% 1.4%
Non-employed
population
65,423 −14,978 −5,012 −12,578 −7,770 −58,295 −52,416
Migration pressure + − − − − − −
Turkey GDP 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 5.0% 5.0% 2.0% 2.0%
Output per worker 2.2% 2.2% 2.2% 3.3% 3.3% 0.0% 0.0%
Working-age
population
1.8% 0.9% 0.6% 1.0% 0.5% 0.8% 0.5%
Employment ratio 0.0% 0.8% 1.2% 0.7% 1.1% 1.2% 1.5%
Non-employed
population
430,897 11,468 −252,805 55,109 −241,963 −119,245 −390,439
Migration pressure + + − + − − −
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economies scenario for the period 2015–2025. That scenario foresees that GDP growth
during that period will mainly come from growth of worker productivity rather than
from creation of more job opportunities and hiring of more workers. Annual GDP
growth is assumed to be 4.5% and annual growth of output per worker is assumed to
be 3.6% so that 80% of GDP growth is assumed to come from productivity growth.
Thus, only 4.5% − 3.6% = 0.9 percentage point of annual GDP growth is assumed to
come from the growth of job opportunities and workers filling those vacancies. How-
ever, with 1.1%, the scenario-predicted annual growth rate of the working-age
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lation growth can be accommodated in terms of employment. The implication is that
the Algerian employment ratio will change by 0.9% − 1.1% = −0.2 percentage point an-
nually. In a situation whereby the working-age population is growing, as in our study
countries, the implication of a declining employment ratio is that the size of the non-
employed population (also see Table 2)—our indicator of migration pressure—will in-
crease. In the case of Algeria, the expected increase is 16,204 persons annually.
Table 3 also shows that in several other instances the scenarios predict that employ-
ment ratios are expected to increase while the size of the non-employed population is
also expected to increase, such as in all scenarios for Turkey for the period 2015–2025.
This happens as long as the annual increase in the number of employed persons is
smaller than the expected annual change1 of the size of the working-age population.
The combination of increasing employment ratios and increasing size of the non-
employed population and migration pressure is also predicted for Morocco by the
business-as-usual scenario for both periods and by the open economies scenario for the
period 2025–2035. This is also predicted by the closed economies scenario for Algeria
for the period 2015–2025.
According to the business-as-usual scenario, our middle-of-the-road scenario,
working-age population growth in Turkey and Morocco will still cause migration pres-
sure to increase in the short-term (2015–2025) in these countries, while in Algeria and
Tunisia a decline is foreseen. In the case of Turkey and Algeria, the most optimistic
scenario in terms of creation of jobs—the closed economies scenario—an increase in
the number of job opportunities and workers filling those positions is insufficient to ac-
commodate working-age population growth. As discussed before, to what extent esti-
mates of future change in numbers of non-employed will lead to change in actual
migration depends on how propensities to migrate at the level of the individual may
change in future (Bruni and Venturini 1995, pp. 380–381).
Figure 1 illustrates how migration pressure in Morocco is expected to increase if the
business-as-usual scenario would unfold. The figure shows how the working-age popula-
tion grows at a rate of 0.8 and 0.7% annually during the 2015–2025 and 2025–2035 pe-
riods, respectively. Because of the assumed annual rates of increase of GDP and worker
productivity, specified in Table 3, numbers of jobs are expected to increase each year.
The increase is such that the ratio of the number of workers to the total working-age
population, i.e. the employment ratio, increases. However, the annual increase in jobs is
smaller than the number of persons with which the working-age population grows each
year. As a result, each year, a residual excess labour supply is added to the non-
employed population (e.g. see Table 2) so that that the non-employed population is still
growing each year, despite increase of the employment ratio. The conclusion therefore
is that migration pressure for Morocco for the period 2015–2035 continues to increase.
Figure 2 illustrates the migration pressure prospects for Morocco in the case of the
closed economies scenario for the period 2025–2035. According to that scenario, in
comparison with the business-as-usual scenario, a relatively larger part of the GDP re-
sults from increase of numbers of jobs rather than worker productivity. This can be
verified from Table 3. The difference between the GDP growth rate and the worker
productivity growth rate in the closed economies scenario (i.e. 2.3% − 0.0% = 2.3%) is
larger than the difference between these two indicators in the business-as-usual
Fig. 1 Migration pressure prospects for Morocco, business-as-usual scenario
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former scenario (e.g. 0.6%) is smaller than that in the latter scenario (e.g. 0.8%). The
net effect is that the employment ratio is increasing to a much higher level by 2035 in
the closed economies scenario than in the business-as-usual scenario. Annual numbers
of jobs created exceed by far the annual number of persons with which the working-
age population grows. Under the assumption that all job vacancies will always be filled,
the annual shortage of number of workers, i.e. the positive balance of demand and sup-
ply of workers, will be recruited from the accumulated reserve of the non-employed
population (also see Table 2). As a result, the size of the non-employed population—the
excess labour in the economy—is shrinking rapidly each year, implying a rapid decrease
of migration pressure.
If the past trend of the decline of population growth in these countries continues,
with Tunisia as forerunner, it can be expected that, under conditions of the assumed
(constant) economic growth indicators, more and more members of the working-age
population will be absorbed by the economy. In the long term, this can be expected to
lead to a decline of the size of the non-employed population and, thus, of migration
pressure in these four countries.Fig. 2 Moroccan migration pressure prospects, closed economies scenario
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In this article, we studied the migration pressure prospects for Algeria, Morocco,
Tunisia and Turkey up to 2035. We explored prospects of economic and working-age
population growth and implications for labour migration pressure. We defined labour
migration pressure according to Bruni and Venturini (1995), which is excess domestic
labour supply—measured as size of the non-employed working-age population—in the
presence of negative per capita income differences with other countries. A parsimoni-
ous decomposition model was developed serving as analytical framework for the design
and calculation of three economic and demographic scenarios. From the scenario re-
sults, estimates of future change in employment ratios and size of the non-employed
population were derived for each country to explore the change in migration pressure
during the period 2015–2035. The business-as-usual scenario describes a future that is
a continuation of past trends in indicators of economic and demographic growth and
of increasingly restrictive (EU) migration policies. The open economies scenario de-
scribes a future of an open and globalized world characterized by the free movement of
persons, capital, innovation and technology and without migration restrictions. The
closed economies scenario is a kind of anti-globalization scenario, including restrictive
emigration and immigration policies.
Main findings are that, in spite of considerable differences in scenario assumptions,
employment ratios are generally expected to increase so that relatively more persons of
working-age will be employed in the future, a first sign of declining migration pressure
in the future. However, the conclusion is also that the business-as-usual and open
economies scenarios suggest that migration pressure in Turkey, and to a lesser extent
in Morocco, is still expected to rise up to 2025 because the size of the non-employed
population will still increase each year, though the speed of growth is decreasing. This
counterintuitive situation occurs because the expected annual growth of numbers of
jobs is outperformed by growth of the size of the working-age population. The fact that
the direction of change in employment ratios and change in non-employed population
size do not run parallel is important to policymakers because it may be tempting to
conclude that policies resulting in lower unemployment rates (i.e. higher employment
ratios) automatically lead to fewer people without employment. The numbers of non-
employed may continue to rise at times when employment ratios rise. The expected
higher employment-related migration pressure in most of these countries should be
taken as an early warning for future higher and perhaps unwanted immigration into
EU countries. To anticipate this, EU countries should, more than before, invest in redu-
cing the migration pressure in the sending countries by assisting in tackling drivers of
migration pressure, such as disparities with EU countries in terms of economic growth,
employment, income, political stability and security (e.g. Borjas 1999).
We developed distinct population scenarios for our study countries while there are
also readily available population scenarios for these countries. For instance, the IIASA
2010–2100 population scenarios by age, sex and educational attainment are available
for 195 countries. They were derived within the context of five Shared Socioeconomic
Pathways (SSP) scenarios of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
(O’Neill et al. 2015; O’Neill et al. 2014; Samir and Lutz 2014; Samir et al. 2013). The
five scenarios are storylines of different environmental and socioeconomic pathways to
the future with distinct effects on emissions and climate change at the global level.
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rived whereby assumptions about future levels of fertility, mortality and migration de-
pend on whether a country already has low or high fertility rates or is a rich OECD
country. In our opinion, the results of such population scenarios are not really suitable
because they need to relate and to be fine-tuned to the particular research objective at
hand. Ours is identifying and exploring different employment-related migration pres-
sure trajectories, taking account of particular characteristics of the spatial context (i.e.
the Mediterranean region and Europe). This is different from the IPCC SSP scenarios
which explore different emission and climate change trajectories at the global level. Dif-
ference in research objectives and spatial context impinges on scenario-specific as-
sumptions about drivers of demographic change (i.e. fertility, mortality and migration),
and this may lead to different population scenario results.
Another issue that can be raised is whether we could have developed a more complex
model which would better represent reality. Such a model could, if data permit, include
labour force participation rates by gender and distinguish between full-, part-time- and
underemployment, and by quality of employment, and by economic sector (Gutierrez
et al. 2007). However, added model complexity would complicate interpretation of sce-
nario results in light of employment-related migration pressure.
A few words need to be said about the plausibility of our scenarios.
Regarding the population scenarios, these cover years (2015–2020) when several
countries in the Mediterranean region are going through a period of political and social
transition of which the outcome is yet uncertain. We assumed that by 2025 this transi-
tion will have been completed resulting in a new status quo which does not lead to
major shifts in demographic behaviour. However, is this reasonable to assume? What
would happen in terms of demographic behaviour if Arab Spring-related protests would
lead to the establishment of anti-western, conservative governments in these four coun-
tries? Can the presented population scenarios encompass working-age population
growth trajectories emerging out of such kind of context? We think the answer is af-
firmative for the following reasons. The first and main reason is that the ‘population
momentum’ embedded in age-sex pyramids in base year 2015 leaves little room for ef-
fects of changes in, say, fertility and mortality, due to a political reorientation between
2015 and 2035. For instance, regarding the impact on the working-age population,
change of fertility rates during the period 2015–2025 will only become visible after
2035. The second reason is that effects of changes in fertility and mortality are attenu-
ated because to some extent they cancel out such as in the case of higher fertility rates
and lower life expectancies.
Regarding the economic scenarios, we assumed GDP growth rates in the range of 1.6
to 5.6%. Assuming a constant annual growth rate of 1.6% is indeed low growth as this
figure would take an economy about 43 years to double its current GDP, while doubling
time would be about 12 years if annual growth would be 5.6%. In light of the observed
current low GDP levels of these countries, this seems as a plausible range for GDP sce-
nario assumptions. Regarding worker productivity, we assume zero improvement or an
improvement of max. 1.5 times of the observed worker productivity over a period of
10 years. Such kind of change has been observed in the past by these countries (ILO 2015).
We assume that migration pressure decreases if the non-employed population size
decreases. In a few cases, we project a considerable increase of the employment ratio,
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the case of Algeria, the business-as-usual scenario predicts that, by 2035, the employ-
ment ratio is expected to increase from about 45% of the working-age population in
2015 to 75% in 2035. Is such a rise realistic in a country where, in 2015, the male em-
ployment ratio is already at an intermediate to high level (75%) but where the female
employment ratio is among the lowest in the world (14%) due to persistent and perva-
sive cultural barriers to work outside the home (Achoui 2006; ILO 2015; World Bank
2011)? The answer is affirmative if, during the period 2015–2035, cultural change per-
mits higher female labour force participation. A rise of the general employment ratio to
75% by 2035 would imply the following. First, the male employment ratio would have
to rise to even higher levels, say to 90%. Such a level seems feasible as it is observed in
parts of Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia where the highest male employment ratios are
found. Second, the employment ratio of Algerian women would then have to increase
from 14% in 2015 to 60% by 2035 to realize a general employment ratio of 75% by
2035. Should existing barriers to female labour force participation prevail, the shortage
of labour would then have to come from immigration, for instance, from Algerian
labour migrants abroad. If this does not take place, a decline of GDP growth is implied.
To conclude, scenario results show that the tempo of migration pressure growth will
level off because working-age population growth is becoming less strong. This supports
claims of several qualitative and theoretical studies (e.g. De Haas 2011; OECD, 2009)
which suggest that, in the long term, demographic growth will become less of a deter-
mining factor in the emigration of residents from these countries. However, up to 2035,
the size of the non-employed population in Turkey and Morocco is expected to be
large and even somewhat increasing. Proximity, presence of a large community of co-
ethnics, political stability and safety and perceptions about better income and employ-
ment in EU countries may result in release of part of this migration pressure in the dir-
ection of Europe, through legal or illegal channels. If current political instability,
sectarian violence, social unrest and insecurity in several countries in the South and
East Mediterranean region continue to spill over to these countries, current refugee
flows to the EU may not come to a halt and it will become increasingly difficult to dis-
tinguish asylum seekers from immigrants driven by economic motives. If so, accultur-
ation of immigrants and social cohesion in EU countries and cities require even greater
attention, anticipation, creativity and action of national policymakers and ethnic com-
munity leaders.Endnotes
1Change in GDP, output per worker and working-age population is reported in terms
of the average annual percentage growth in the 10-year time interval. Change in the
employment ratio is reported as the average annual percentage-point change. Change
in the non-employed population is reported as the average annual number of persons
with which the non-employed population changes. The “+” or “−” signs pertaining to
migration pressure conveys whether the non-employed population—our measure of
migration pressure—is expected to increasing or decrease.
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